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Sexual Violence and Exploitation of Local Women by UN Peacekeepers: Addressing Militarized Masculinity

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# Table of Contents

Glossary of Acronyms 1

Introduction 2

Background 11
  *Synthesis of Sexual Exploitation* 12
  *Synthesis of Sexual Violence* 17

Theory: Militarized Masculinity 19

Militarized Masculinity as a Root Cause of Sexual Violence and Exploitation 23

Militarized Masculinity: An Obstacle to Implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 31
  *Militarized Masculinity and Training* 34
  *Militarized Masculinity and Impunity* 37
  *Militarized Masculinity and Implementation Practices of the UN* 41

Suggestions for More Effective Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 44

Conclusion 50

Bibliography 52

Appendices 56
Acronyms

DPKO – UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS – The Economic Community of West African States
MONUC – United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NAP’s – National Action Plans
OAU – Organization of African Unity
OIOS – UN Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
TCC’s – Troop Contributing Countries
TES – Training and Evaluation Service
Since the 1990’s, there has been a rise in sexual violence and sexual exploitation of local women by UN Peacekeepers. Although there are UN policies to counter sexual violence by peacekeepers, there is a significant disconnect between these policies and the way they are implemented on the ground. The international community is concerned that by engaging in sexual violence and sexual exploitation of local women, UN peacekeepers are exacerbating aspects of the conflicts that they are being sent to mitigate. Feminist organizations are concerned that the UN is not taking enough precautions to ensure that the rights of local women are protected during peacekeeping operations. However, a third concern is being raised amongst some feminist scholars that suggest that UN peacekeepers need to be demilitarized before embarking on peacekeeping missions. Scholars such as Cynthia Enloe and Sandra Whitworth argue that a trait ingrained in soldiers during training called “militarized masculinity” is the root cause explaining why soldiers engage in sexual violence - until militarized masculinity is addressed, sexual violence against women will continue within the military and UN peacekeeping missions.

My research will explore militarized masculinity as a root cause of sexual violence conducted by UN peacekeepers and examine the success of UN policies to combat sexual violence. The first section will provide a background explaining the development of sexual violence and sexual exploitation in peacekeeping missions, providing examples throughout. The second section will provide an in-depth description of Sandra Whitworth’s theory of militarized masculinity and how it links to UN peacekeeping. The third section will explain how militarized masculinity is an obstacle to policies that aim to counter sexual violence in UN peacekeeping. The fourth section will provide suggestions on how to address militarized masculinity within these policies in order to make them more effective on the ground. The findings illustrate that Whitworth’s theory of militarized masculinity aids in explaining the phenomenon of sexual violence against local women by UN peacekeepers. Since the majority of UN peacekeepers come from their nation’s militaries, they often bring hyper-masculine and highly militarized behaviours with them on peacekeeping missions, resulting in higher rates of sexual violence and exploitation. One of the reasons for the disconnect between theory and practice of policies to counter sexual violence is that militarized masculinity exacerbates existing obstacles to implementing these policies, while also creating new ones.
Introduction

Since the increase of large-scale UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990’s, sexual violence conducted by UN peacekeepers against local women has become a problem that has raised controversy within the international community (Whitworth 2004: 24). UN peacekeeping troops have taken part in sexual exploitation and sexual violence, including, but not limited to prostitution, “fake marriages,” rape, “peacekeeper babies,” and sexual abuse of local women (Whitworth 2004: 70; Higate 2007: 100; Spencer 2005: 168). The major controversy surrounding these events stems from the fact that sexual violence is antithetical to the major characteristics associated with peacekeeping, including non-violence and neutrality (Whitworth 2004: 104). Another aspect of the controversy is that incidents of sexual violence uncover the fact that UN peacekeepers are susceptible to becoming implicated in the same conflicts that they seek to address (Whitworth 2004: 24).

As UN peacekeeping missions became more complex and the problem of sexual violence became more noticeable in the international community, the UN began implementing new methods to recognize gender sensitivity and the needs of women (Whitworth 2004: 119). Of these efforts, the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 1325 and 1820 have addressed the need for contributing countries to adopt a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations as well as appropriate gender training for peacekeepers in order to prevent sexual violence (Carey 2001: 52; Peacebuild 2011: 2). In many ways, the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions’ call to mainstream gender within UN peacekeeping and security efforts at the policy level have been successful. However, there has been a disconnect between these UN policies and efforts being made in practice (Carey 2001: 57). Attempts made at incorporating a gendered perspective during missions and in pre-deployment training by both the UN and contributing countries have generally been unsuccessful at combating sexual violence (Carey 2001: 57; Peacebuild 2011: 13-14). Thus, there is a need to examine this disconnect and determine implementation strategies that will be successful at combating sexual violence in peacekeeping operations.

Some of the feminist scholars that will be examined in this paper argue that the disconnect between policy and practice for ending sexual misconduct of UN peacekeepers cannot be resolved until the root causes are examined or widely acknowledged. More specifically, Whitworth (2004) and Enloe (2000) argue that one of the root causes is a militarized masculine identity that many peacekeepers previously attained before departing on UN missions. This identity is called militarized masculinity. Whitworth argues that since the majority of UN peacekeepers come from military backgrounds, they are not properly demilitarized before being deployed for peacekeeping operations (2004: 153). This results in UN peacekeeping personnel embarking on missions with highly militarized and hypermasculine behaviours that may not be ideal in a peacekeeping setting (Whitworth 2004: 153). It also raises the question as to whether successful gender security can be achieved until militarized masculinity is recognized in efforts to prevent peacekeepers from engaging in sexual violence.

1 Refer to Appendix A
Thesis
It will be argued that militarized masculinity is one of the root causes of sexual violence conducted by UN peacekeepers and a reason that the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions have not been successful in practice is because of the pervasiveness of militarized masculinity. The success of efforts to implement UN policies to end sexual violence in peacekeeping missions depends on whether militarized masculinity is addressed as a root cause.

Methodology
This paper will use a normative approach along with critical and feminist methodologies to explore why peacekeepers engage in sexual violence against local women and to determine whether the concept of militarized masculinity assists in explaining this phenomenon. It will also use these methodologies to help bridge the gap between theory and policy. More specifically, it will examine whether militarized masculinity can be adequately addressed by efforts to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. The aspects of feminist and critical methodologies that this paper will use are: an analysis of the secondary literature, an analysis of the theory of militarized masculinity, an analysis of UN documents and training efforts, and interviews of peacekeepers, UN officials, and local women conducted by other researchers.

When examining militarized masculinity as a root cause of sexual violence and sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers, it is important to note that although some fieldwork has been conducted, most of the research on militarized masculinity as a root cause is theoretical. Although a wide variety of field research is lacking on this topic, researchers who study militarized masculinity and its connection to sexual violence within UN peacekeeping argue that militarized masculinity is a pervasive issue that is deeply rooted at the heart of the problem (Whitworth 2004: 152; Enloe 2000: 3, Betts-Fetherston 1998: 172). Thus, even though in-mission fieldwork and interviews provide evidence of hyper-masculine behaviours, much of the analysis of these behaviours as being militarized masculinity comes from the theory itself. One of the goals of this paper is to combine the fieldwork and the theory to examine militarized masculinity as a root cause of sexual violence by peacekeepers; however another goal is to further dialogue on militarized masculinity in peacekeeping in order to foster more interest and understanding about the topic.

Feminist methodology must be explained in more detail if its purpose for this paper is to be fully understood. An important aspect of feminist research is that it focuses on the ways in which knowledge is taken for granted and attempts to not only build on existing knowledge, but also question its validity (Hesse-Biber 2007: 4). Thus, one of the goals of feminist methodology and for this paper is to deconstruct existing or traditional knowledge and to create new meanings (Kim 2007: 107). This paper will examine new meanings developed by feminist theorists that explain root causes of sexual violence in peacekeeping.

Furthermore, one of the most important aspects of feminist methodology that will be of central importance to this paper is feminist standpoint theory. Feminist standpoint theory means that the perspective of the most marginalized people that one is researching must be included and not taken for granted (Harding 2007: 45). At the heart of this theory is the belief that the standpoint of women and marginalized groups who are implicated within the issue are best
equipped to understand aspects of the conflict that are often excluded from analysis (Harding 2007: 54-55). For this paper, the marginalized people that are implicated within the topic of study are the local women who are survivors of sexual violence or exploitation. Their experiences and opinions are crucial for a holistic understanding of the issues involved and for creating viable suggestions on how to enhance gender security.

**Structure**

Another one of the key components of feminist research is that it “…goes beyond documenting what is, to proposing an alternative and imaginative vision of what should be” (Pillow and Mayo 2007: 150). The structure of this paper is built with the ultimate goal of documenting what is by deconstructing existing theory and policies and it will propose what should be by providing an alternative to efforts currently being made to prevent sexual violence in UN peacekeeping missions. This paper will be divided into five sections. The first section of this paper will provide a background on sexual violence in UN peacekeeping missions from the 1990’s to the present. It will accomplish this by engaging in a synthesis of the various missions where sexual violence and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers has been a problem. The purpose of this section is to point out how sexual violence conducted by UN peacekeepers is an ongoing problem, rather than an isolated incident. The second section will explain Whitworth’s concept of militarized masculinity as a root cause for behaviours of sexual violence among UN peacekeepers. The third section of this paper will examine Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 1325 and 1820 as well as international efforts to implement them in UN peacekeeping missions. This section will also discuss the obstacles to implementation that have prevented success in practice. The final section of this paper will focus on bridging theory and policy. It will examine the ways in which efforts to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions to end sexual violence in peacekeeping missions can incorporate an understanding of militarized masculinity in order to become more successful. It will provide suggestions for both immediate and long-term implementation.

**Identifying the Scope**

The literature that this paper will focus on is written by feminist authors that are well known for their research on gender issues in peacekeeping and militarization. The two primary authors that will be examined to conceptualize militarized masculinity are Whitworth (2004) and Enloe (2000). The other sections of this paper will focus on literature from a range of feminist authors that focus on sexual violence in specific peacekeeping missions or authors that have analyzed the effectiveness of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions within peacekeeping operations.

It is also important to mention what is beyond the scope of this paper in order to ensure that its direction is established at the beginning. First, it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a cultural analysis of the peacekeepers that have engaged in sexual violence or their contributing countries. Although cultural background is an important aspect of how identities such as masculinity develop, the available literature focuses mainly on western notions of masculine identity and thus the influence of cultural backgrounds of other contributing countries will not be examined in full. However, some examples of how non-western contributing countries have approached gender issues in peacekeeping contexts will be examined in the final
section of this paper. Furthermore, although there have been cases of sexual violence within other peacekeeping missions that were conducted by smaller groups of countries or regional forces, such as NATO, ECOWAS, and the OAU, this paper will focus solely on UN operations (Hudson 2005: 111-112). Since the UN has provided universal standards for conduct during peacekeeping missions, it is the point of reference for other non-UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, the eradication of sexual violence and sexual exploitation within UN peacekeeping operations may in turn help eradicate it in non-UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, documents discussing the implementation of gender resources for peacekeeping operations were first introduced by the UN and thus, these are the most widely accessible foreign policy documents discussing the importance of linking gender and peacekeeping.

The Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions are crucial to study because efforts to implement a gendered perspective in UN peacekeeping operations have stemmed from the recommendations made in these Resolutions (Carey 2001: 52). This paper will only be engaging in an analysis of certain aspects of Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions 1325 and 1820 that pertain specifically to gender security in peacekeeping and the conduct of peacekeepers. Resolution 1325 covers a wide range of gender mainstreaming recommendations, however, not all pertain to peacekeeping operations. Resolution 1820 covers issues relating to sexual violence in conflict, but the sections on sexual violence with regards to peacekeeping operations will be the focus of analysis.

It is also important to note that this paper does not discredit the fact that there can be other root causes to sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers, such as impunity laws and short time spans allocated for general training (Bedont 2005: 87; Raven-Roberts 2005: 57). In fact, this paper examine the literature to show how militarized masculinity is an element that is rooted within issues such as impunity and training and is therefore assisting in creating obstacles to implementing gender security. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which militarized masculinity presents itself as a root cause of sexual violence and exploitation and how it can exacerbate other perceived root causes. Militarized masculinity is an under-examined theory and thus, this paper will seek to foster attention towards it and uncover its pervasiveness in the realm of peacekeeping (Whitworth 2004: 152).

Defining Key Terms

Sexual Violence

Since one of the main purposes of this paper is to explain the reasons why UN peacekeepers engage in sexual violence, it is important to outline what encompasses sexual violence. The analysis conducted in this paper will rely on the World Health Organization’s definition:

Any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting. It includes rape, defined as the physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration (World Health Organization 2011).
This description makes it clear that sexual violence is not exclusive to acts of rape.

**Sexual Exploitation**

Sexual exploitation is linked to sexual violence in many ways, as exploitation exacerbates systemic violence and paves the way for vulnerability of the local women that they are exploiting. The fact that peacekeeping personnel have sexually exploited local women in host countries is central to the problem of sexual misconduct among peacekeepers. Sexual exploitation is defined in the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2003) as: “Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (13). Sexual relationships between peacekeepers and local women further polarize the power disparity between locals and peacekeepers and it can exacerbate economic instability (Spencer 2005: 168).

**Local Women**

Henry Higate (2007) points out that internally displaced people should be included under the term “local women” when referring to sexual exploitation in peacekeeping missions (117). His suggestion will be applied to this paper. The term “local women” is used to emphasize that this paper is focusing exclusively on sexual violence against the population within the host country.

**Militarization**

Militarized masculinity is a product of the process of militarization and since militarized masculinity is the central theoretical focus of this paper, it is important to first clarify and define what is meant by the term “militarization.” Enloe (2000) defines militarization as:

A step-by-step process by which a person or thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumption to be not only valuable, but also normal (3).

Enloe explains that anything and anyone can be militarized. Some examples that she gives are toys, jobs, voting, fashion, and most importantly, identities (2000: 33). One of the most defining aspects of militarization is that it can dominate a person’s worldview and dictate how they live their daily lives (2000: 33). Enloe says that this can occur for someone, “without ever wielding a rifle or donning a helmet” (2000: 33). She argues that privileging masculinity is part of the militarization process and it is not a product of tradition or culture, but deliberate, conscious, and traceable political decisions (2000: 33). She says that some examples of these traceable decisions that privilege masculinity in the military are the rules that determine a woman soldier’s hemline and criteria for what it means to be a “good” military wife (2000: 33). These decisions set the stage for unequal gender relations, both within the military and between military men and civilian women.
Militarized Masculinity

In her book, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping*, Whitworth (2004) argues that militarization goes beyond privileging masculinity (160). She contends that many militaries construct their own identity for soldiers, that she calls “militarized masculinity” (2004: 152). More specifically, Whitworth argues that militarized masculinity is characterized by a hegemonic hyper-masculine behaviour, and hyper-militarized identity that most soldiers develop during the training process (2004: 152). Thus, she points out that there is a strong correlation between hegemonic masculine behaviours and militarization (2004: 160). This concept will be discussed extensively in the second section of this paper.

Background: Peacekeepers Engaging in Sexual Violence and Exploitation

This section will provide a synthesis of some of the examples out of the plethora to choose from when examining sexual violence and sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers. All of the examples that will be explored in the following synthesis are quintessential in helping to provide an understanding of the inherent issues that sexual violence and exploitation creates in peacekeeping missions. The purpose of providing this synthesis is also to make it clear that sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers is not an isolated incident. It has been an ongoing problem since the surge of large-scale UN peacekeeping operations after the Cold War (Whitworth 2004: 119).

Synthesis of Sexual Exploitation

As mentioned in the key terms section of this paper, sexual exploitation includes involvement in prostitution and sexual relationships with local women because it often exacerbates economic and social insecurity in host countries of peacekeeping operations (Spencer 2005: 171). During the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the Cambodian Women’s Development Association said that the presence of UN peacekeeping troops created an alarming rise in prostitution (Whitworth 2004: 67). More specifically, the Association estimated that the rise in the number of prostitutes in Cambodia grew from 6,000 before the UNTAC mission to 25,000 during the mission in 1992 (Whitworth 2004: 67). Peacekeeping troops were seen entering brothels and instead of condemning their actions, peacekeeping officers told their troops to make their actions more discreet by parking their vans elsewhere or not wearing their uniforms while approaching prostitutes (Whitworth 2004: 69).

Furthermore, according to Whitworth, the rise in prostitution due to UNTAC’s involvement led to an exacerbation of hostilities between Cambodia and Vietnam (Whitworth 2004: 67). She argues that the reason for this is because reports were being made by Cambodians against the Vietnamese, saying that Vietnamese women who had immigrated into Cambodia accounted for the vast majority of prostitutes in the country (Whitworth 2004: 67). This led to skepticism over the UNTAC mission amongst some Cambodians (Whitworth 2004: 68). The

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2 Refer to Appendix B
Khmer Rouge took advantage of this by raising propaganda that UNTAC was using prostitution as a method of slowly helping the Vietnamese colonize Cambodia (Whitworth 2004: 68). Whitworth points out that some Cambodians who were skeptical of UNTAC personnel believed this propaganda (2004: 68). Although some of the prostitutes were Vietnamese women and girls that immigrated to Cambodia to get jobs in the growing business, many of them were also Cambodian (Whitworth 2004: 68). During Whitworth’s interviews with local Cambodians, a man said, “everyone started to wonder what they had come here for, to implement a peace accord or to turn our women into prostitutes” (2004: 68). These events show how sexual exploitation of local women by peacekeepers can lead to an exacerbation of the conflicts they are there to address (Whitworth 2004: 68).

What was even more problematic is that along with the rise in prostitution, UNTAC peacekeepers also caused a significant rise in HIV/AIDS in the country (Whitworth 2004: 68). One of the popular trends among the Cambodians that Whitworth interviewed was to re-name the acronym UNTAC to “the United Nations Transmission of AIDS to Cambodia” (2004: 69). According to Whitworth, UNTAC’s chief medical officer told the Phnom Penh newspaper that seven times more UN personnel would die of AIDS than from the conflict in Cambodia (2004: 68). This shows how peacekeepers’ engagement in prostitution can also exacerbate social and economic problems in ways that extend beyond individual local women into the community at large (Whitworth 2004: 68).

According to Whitworth and Jennar, the mission in Cambodia was understood by the UN as a “test case” from which lessons for future peacekeeping missions were supposed to be learned and applied (Whitworth 2004: 59; Jennar 1994: 145). However, as Whitworth has said, the lessons learned from Cambodia with regards to sexual exploitation were not applied to subsequent peacekeeping operations (Whitworth 2004: 67). The UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa are an example of this.

During a five-week fieldwork study on sexual exploitation of women by peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and the DR Congo in 2003, Higate (2007) concluded that many women and girls become prostitutes solely to “seek out” the service UN peacekeepers (109). The reason for this is because peacekeepers are known for paying larger sums of money than local men (Higate 2007: 109). However, the fact that prostitutes sometimes approach the peacekeepers instead of vice versa is viewed by the troops as a form of agency. Spencer (2005) provides an explanation of this dynamic:

Exchanging sex or sexual acts to obtain protection, assistance, food and non-food items is sometimes misunderstood as an expression of agency. These acts may appear to increase a woman’s agency and her sense of control over her body as she is choosing to engage in sexual activity for some benefit. Given the distorted power dynamics present in conflict, however, these exploitative circumstances are not real choices (171).

Thus, the real reason why many local women become involved in relationships with the peacekeepers is because they know that troops will have money to help sustain their families (Higate 2007: 106).
In the DR Congo, UN peacekeepers have engaged in prostitution with girls as young as ten years old (Notar 2006: 417). A civilian UN worker told Higate during his field study that at one of the local high schools in the eastern region of the DR Congo, “at least two-thirds of the girls are paying their fees with money made from sleeping with peacekeepers” (2007: 107). These girls offer sex to peacekeepers in exchange for small amounts of food and money (Notar 2006: 417). For example, a Washington Post article focused on a fourteen year-old girl in the DR Congo named Yvette who had been raped when she was ten years old by Congolese soldiers (Notar 2006: 417; Wax 2005: 21). After being raped, she became a prostitute because she was abandoned by her family and did not know how else to support herself (Wax 2005: 21). She was later given the nickname “one-dollar girl” because she charged UN peacekeepers one dollar for sexual services (Wax 2005: 21). When asked by the reporter how she felt about being a prostitute for peacekeepers, Yvette said: “I’m sad about it. But I needed the dollars. I can’t go farm because of the militias. Who will feed me?...Sometimes it happens in UN cars, other times at the camp. But at least they paid us. I was worthless anyhow. My honor was lost” (Wax 2005: 21).

It is problematic in many ways when UN peacekeepers engage in prostitution of local women. For example, the age of ten is below both the age of consent in the DR Congo (which is fourteen) (Higate 2007:107). However, in the MONUC Code of Conduct, the UN emphasizes that soldiers must not have sex with anyone under the age of eighteen, regardless of the age of consent in the host country (Higate 2007: 107; MONUC Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 2004). Despite this, three peacekeepers told Higate that having sex with young local girls, even under the age of consent in the DR Congo was “respectful of local culture” (2007: 107). Giving young women food and money in exchange for sex is also problematic because instead of discovering more sustainable ways to help them thrive economically, they are only temporarily supporting them and sexually exploiting them in the process (Higate 2007: 107). Thus, once the UN peacekeepers are repatriated and the mission is over, many young women will be back where they began: ostracized from their communities without a sustainable living (Higate 2007: 107).

Some other common examples of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers were, “fake marriages” and “peace babies” between peacekeepers and local women. “Fake marriages” is a term that was used during the UNTAC (Whitworth 2004: 70). It refers to when a local woman and a male peacekeeper develop a sexual relationship, get married, and then the peacekeeper is repatriated because his deployment ends (Whitworth 2004: 70). The reason that these were called fake marriages is because of the rigid Cambodian gender norms that resulted in the exclusion and shaming of women who did not follow them (Whitworth 2004: 70). Marriages in which husbands abandoned their Cambodian wives were considered to be a violation of these norms (Whitworth 2004: 70). Thus, once the peacekeepers left the country, the local women experienced many social hardships. They were often ostracized from their families and communities, making it difficult to build new relationships and find work (Whitworth 2004: 70).

“Peace babies” is a term that was developed early on during MONUC and it refers to children that are conceived by peacekeepers and local women (Higate and Henry 2004: 492). Peace babies were extremely controversial because the local women had to deal with two major repercussions that exacerbated their insecurity (Higate and Henry 2004: 492). First, the women were faced with the social stigma of having children outside of marriage (Higate and Henry
2004: 492). According to Higate and Henry, this caused social problems between local men and peacekeepers because the men were resentful of the fact that peacekeepers were having sexual relations with “their women” (2004: 492). Higate and Henry also argue that this caused damage to the reputation of the UN amongst the local population (2004: 492). Furthermore, issues of mixed race arose from the arrival of peace babies, which in turn undermined the long-term social and economic security of the local women and their families (2004: 492). Thus, similarly to how women in Cambodia were ostracized for having “fake marriages,” women in the DR Congo were ostracized for having children in ways that were considered to be untraditional. In addition to peace babies in the DR Congo, it has been estimated that 25,000 children were conceived by peacekeepers in Cambodia and 6,600 children were fathered by soldiers during the UN Observer mission in Liberia (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 7). The number of peace babies in the DR Congo is currently unknown, since the mission is still underway (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 7).

The second repercussion is that the local women’s economic hardships were exacerbated because once the peacekeepers were finished their deployment, the local women were faced with the sole responsibility of supporting the children (Higate and Henry 2004: 492). Patel and Tripodi (2005) point out that many local women did not hear from the fathers after they left the DR Congo (592). In fact, Patel and Tripodi argue that many peacekeepers abandoned the local women, leaving them without any means of financial stability or survival (Patel and Tripodi 2005: 592). Issues such as peace babies show how peacekeeping operations are more gendered than the UN and contributing countries expected them to be. Patel and Tripodi contend that, “only through a more sophisticated understanding of gendered experiences and sexual relations, can more effective policies and practices be initiated” (2005: 594).

**Synthesis of Sexual Violence**

In almost every UN peacekeeping mission since the early 1990’s to the present, peacekeeping troops have been the subject of complaints and reports of sexual violence (Whitworth 2004: 24). During interviews in Cambodia, a doctor at a medical NGO in Phnom Penh told Jennar that for a period of time, the majority of injured people using the hospital’s resources were young children who were victims of sexual abuse by UN soldiers (1994: 154). Furthermore, one of the women that Whitworth interviewed expressed how women felt as though UNTAC exacerbated their vulnerability in the conflict: “After 13 years of war, people feel afraid. There is no place for them to go, no support if they want to say no. And now they have another form of harassment: UNTAC” (2004: 70).

In Bosnia Herzegovina, Bosniak women had already experienced widespread and traumatic sexual violence during the Yugoslav Dissolution Wars (Copelon 1994: 194). It was determined that rape was used by the Serbs as a form of ethnic cleansing and a tool of genocide (MacKinnon 1994: 11). The UN peacekeeping operation was designed to ease hostilities as a result of the genocide and ethnic cleansing that took place (Vandenberg 2008: 150). However, instead of taking measures to ensure that the peacekeepers were taking all of the necessary steps to ensure the safety and protection of Bosniak women and girls, some of them took part in exacerbating their experiences of sexual violence (Vandenberg 2008: 151). It was reported that UN peacekeepers “routinely groped the breasts and buttocks of women during searches in the
town” (Vandenberg 2005: 153). In her participatory research in Bosnia, Vandenberg argues that, “even as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina still raged, reports surfaced of peacekeeper sexual misconduct” (2005: 153). For example, some peacekeepers were sent to a mental hospital in Bakovici, Bosnia to protect three hundred patients that consisted mainly of women survivors of sexual violence from the conflict (Vandenberg 2005: 153). It was later reported in 1996 that some of the soldiers stationed in the mental hospital had engaged in sexual violence against patients in the hospital (Vandenberg 2005: 153).

In 2004, reports began surfacing about UN peacekeepers raping local women and children during the MONUC (Notar 2006: 417). MONUC has some of the most detailed reports of sexual violence. The United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services Report (OIOS) conducted an investigation of seventy-two allegations of sexual violence by MONUC peacekeepers (Notar 2006: 417). From these investigations, there are numerous reports by victims of peacekeepers engaging in detailed and disturbing acts, such as videotaping themselves torturing, raping, and abusing naked women and girls (Notar 2006: 417).

**Theory: Militarized Masculinity**

Some feminist scholars have studied the ways in which sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers is directly linked to the construction of manhoods and masculinities (Higate 2007; Whitworth 2004; Enloe 2000). Whitworth (2004) examines the ways in which masculinity is constructed in the military and studies its link to sexual violence against women by soldiers. She argues that militarized masculinity is characterized by a hegemonic hyper-masculine and hyper-militarized identity that most soldiers develop during the training process (2004: 152). Whitworth studies it in isolation from other dominant forms of masculinity (2004: 152). A quote provided by Morgan (1994) stresses the importance of studying militarized masculinity in isolation:

> Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct. Despite far reaching political, social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity…The stance, facial expressions, and the weapons clearly connote aggression, courage, a capacity for violence, and sometimes, willingness for sacrifice. The uniform absorbs individualities into a generalized and timeless masculinity while also connoting a control of emotion and subordination to a larger reality (165).

This quote from Morgan shows that the military is its own institution and the identities of the soldiers within the military are constructed in order to make them efficient and prepared for times of combat (Whitworth 2004: 3). However, according to Whitworth, not only are they trained for combat, they are also trained to develop and promote problematic and dangerous epistemologies (Whitworth 2004: 3). She argues that, “soldiers are not born, they are made; and part of what goes into the making of a soldier is a celebration and reinforcement of some of the most aggressive, and most insecure, elements of masculinity: those that promote violence, misogyny, homophobia, and racism” (2004: 3). Furthermore, she stresses that militarized masculinity is dangerous because soldiers are taught that they are entitled to express violence, misogyny, homophobia, and racism, especially if it allows them to perform their “soldierly duties” more efficiently (2004: 3).
Whitworth also contends that sometimes even teaching combat skills often becomes secondary to teaching manhood and “making men out of soldiers” (2004: 160). Part of transitioning into militarized masculinity involves soldiers having to eliminate everything that is perceived as feminine from their identities in order to eliminate emotions that will not fare well in combat such as fear, guilt, and sympathy (Whitworth 2004: 161). In fact, according to Whitworth, anger is considered to be the only acceptable emotion within the military and if a soldier expresses other emotions that are deemed feminine, the group ridicules them and their identity as soldiers and “men” are challenged (Whitworth 2004: 161). For example, Whitworth explains that soldiers who quit basic training are taunted by others with language such as, “you’re not a man, right? You’re a little boy, aren’t you? You can’t be trusted” and more emasculating name-calling is used to bring forward gender identity anxieties, such as, “sissy,” “lady,” and “faggot” (2004: 161). This shows that the clothes soldiers wear are not the only part of soldiering that is meant to be uniform; so too are their identities and there are consequences for deviating from this uniformity.

Whitworth argues that in addition to eliminating everything considered feminine within them, soldiers have to look down upon all other areas of difference, such as women, people of colour, and homosexuality (2004: 161). She adds that soldiers are taught to eliminate the “other” within themselves and to dehumanize the perceived external “other” in order to be capable of eliminating the enemy during combat (2004: 161). Betts-Fetherston (1998) contends that it is important to recognize dehumanization of the “other” with regards to gender relations, as masculinities and femininities are both constructed in relation to the gender norms of other cultures (159). She argues that as a result, local women in conflict-ridden countries are more vulnerable to threats to their security because they are “othered” through both their gendered and ethnic identities (2004: 159). Thus, it can be argued that soldiers that are trained in military warfare are subsequently trained in cultural and gender insensitivity (Lopes 2011: 6).

Whitworth also argues that in order to attract men to the concept of becoming soldiers, new recruits are taught that they are entitled to sexual encounters with women (2004: 163). Whitworth uses Enloe’s (1993a) interviews of military officials regarding the Tailhook case of 1991 as an example of how soldiers feel this sense of entitlement (2004: 163). The Tailhook incident involved the sexual harassment of civilian women in a hotel by male military pilots (Lopes 2011: 6). Enloe quotes the reaction of a military official to public concerns over the incident:

If male aircraft pilots can’t have a few drinks and send women down a hotel corridor gauntlet, how are they supposed to militarily bond with one another?...And if a woman who isn’t sexually attracted to even benign versions of male heterosexuality is permitted to openly express her sexual indifference to masculinized pilots, then what’s the prize waiting at the end of the war? (1993a: 84).

This statement shows that not only does the military teach its soldiers to feel entitled to sexual encounters with women, but it also teaches them to bond over these experiences (Enloe 2001: 111). Enloe (2001) points out that the paradigm in the military is that if soldiers do not have prostitutes available to them, they will have to resort to “recreational rape” and violence against women (111; Lopes 2011: 11).
All of the factors discussed above combine to create the “aggressive and violent heterosexuality” that characterizes militarized masculinity (Whitworth 2004: 162). The analysis provided by Whitworth shows how militarized masculinity is extremely problematic. Being taught to dehumanize the other, to look down upon emotions that are perceived as feminine, and to feel entitled to sex with women has the potential to lead to violence outside the realm of military warfare (Whitworth 2004: 166; Lopes 2011: 6).

Whitworth argues that the first site of violence outside of warfare where militarized masculinity is exercised is in the homes of military families (2004: 166). She says that family violence, especially sexual violence against military wives runs deeper than an inability to “turn off” soldierly attitudes (2004: 165). Instead, it is rooted in the fact that militarized masculinity and the promises that create it, “…must be constantly confirmed and reconfirmed in order to appear naturalized or stable” (Whitworth 2004: 165). By this, Whitworth means that when soldiers leave the military, whether temporarily or permanently, the privileges promised to them that are associated with militarized masculinity do not exist in their lives at home (2004: 166). She describes this by saying:

The discrepancy between the myths and promises associated with militarized masculinity on the one hand and on the other the actual conditions of militarized men’s lives can be so enormous, that some of those men resort to violence directed at family members in an effort to reestablish for themselves the equilibrium of their militarized masculine credentials…[they are] involved in a constant denigration and violence directed at ‘others’ who undermined the privileges and entitlements, the ultimately unfulfilled promises on which militarized masculinity rests (166).

Whitworth’s interview with the former wife of a Canadian military officer reiterates this through lived experience. She described her experiences of domestic abuse by saying, “…because these guys are so controlled…then they come home and they want to control at home. And if you have any type of opinion, or your don’t agree with them, then you’re the bad guy and you get beat on”’ (Whitworth 2004: 166). Enloe (1993b) suggests that the refusal of soldiers to redefine militarized masculinity will be played out, not only in family life, but also within interactions with women acquaintances and in exchanges with women who are complete strangers (26). Since militarized masculinity makes soldiers more susceptible to engaging in violence outside the military sphere, the question arises as to whether militarized masculinity plays a role in the sexual misconduct of UN peacekeepers.

**Militarized Masculinity as a Root Cause of Sexual Violence and Exploitation in Peacekeeping**

In 1993, Enloe said that, “To date, we in fact know amazingly little about what happens to a male soldier’s sense of masculine license when he dons the blue helmet or armband of the United Nations peacekeeper” (1993b: 84). Since then, feminist scholars have been examining the links between militarized masculinity and the problem of sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers. It is important to note that although much research has been conducted on militarized masculinity within the past decade, there is still much research to be done not just on
militarized masculinity outside the military, but also within it (Whitworth 2004: 152). Thus, most of the research on militarized masculinity has been theoretical. However, the findings presented in this paper on militarized masculinity as a root cause of sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers is based off of both the field research that has taken place and the theoretical links provided by the literature. Furthermore, as Whitworth suggests, continuous research is important to establishing the possible links between militarized masculinity and sexual violence by peacekeepers, even if there appears to be other root causes (2004: 152). It is also important to note that there are other root causes to sexual violence by peacekeepers. For example, impunity, cultural insensitivity, and a lack of time available for intensive training are root causes suggested by other researchers. However, as the literature points out, militarized masculinity is indeed a root cause that can exacerbate these other causes as well. This will be discussed in further detail in the next section of this paper.

The literature suggests that militarized masculinity is an important theory to assist in explaining why UN peacekeepers engage in sexual misconduct. The main driving force for researching the link between militarized masculinity and sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers is that the military consists of a large portion of UN peacekeeping personnel. More specifically, six out of every seven peacekeepers come from their national militaries and have therefore been exposed to the masculine norms of the military (Higate and Henry 2004: 484). Based on the theoretical research and field interviews provided by the literature, there are specific aspects of militarized masculinity that have been at work within the dynamic of sexual violence and exploitation of local women by UN peacekeepers. First, the research shows that there is a general atmosphere amongst in-mission peacekeeping personnel that male peacekeepers are entitled to sexual encounters with local women, especially if it makes them bond together as a group and perform their duties more efficiently (Higate and Henry 2004: 484). In fact, peacekeepers are often encouraged to engage in sexual relations with local women for these reasons (Whitworth 2004: 69). Second, the research also shows that some UN peacekeepers have a colonial view of local women (Higate and Henry 2004: 491). More specifically, some peacekeeping soldiers view local women as both the gender and cultural “other” in order to justify sexual encounters with local women (Higate and Henry 2004: 488). It can be argued that militarized masculinity is present as a root cause of this, because the behaviour of peacekeepers directly coincides with the behaviours linked to militarized masculinity as described above.

While conducting semi-structured interviews with UN peacekeepers in Sierra-Leone and the DR Congo, Higate’s goal was to “understand the ways in which peacekeepers constructed their masculinity in relation to local women” (Higate and Henry 2004: 488). His findings show a general culture amongst peacekeepers that reinforced a masculine license to have sexual encounters with local women, especially if it made them more efficient at performing their duties or helped them bond as soldiers (Higate and Henry 2004: 488).

Higate’s research found that not only were male peacekeepers open about their sexual encounters with local women, they also consistently brought up their sexual encounters with local women without being asked (Higate and Henry 2004: 489). Higate and Henry point out that this demonstrates that sexual relations with local women was central to the peacekeepers’ identity as men (2004: 489). They were open about their sexual relations with local women
because they normalized it as being “central to their masculinities,” meaning that it should be assumed that male peacekeepers need to have a sexual outlet when they are on missions (2004: 490). Thus, Higate and Henry argue that male peacekeepers constructed their masculine identity in relation to local women in highly sexualized ways (2004: 489). Whitworth points out that the “boys will be boys” theory explaining sexual exploitation of local women as expressions of biological natural urges is often used by militaries and soldiers to naturalize militarized masculinity (2004: 106). Thus, it is also a way of reinforcing the notion that peacekeepers have an entitlement to sexual relations with local women. Higate’s field research suggests that peacekeepers felt entitled to sexual encounters with local women because it fulfilled their “natural” masculine sexual needs which would in turn make them more efficient in their duties as peacekeepers (2007: 105). According to Higate, even one of the female UN peacekeepers said that she, “preferred to work with a man who had a sexual outlet of [the commercial] kind, since he was more likely to be ‘controlled’ in the office during the working day” (2007: 105). This shows how militarized masculinity can be naturalized by anyone, not just male soldiers who exemplify behaviours associated with militarized masculinity (Enloe 2000: 33).

Similarly to Higate’s findings in the DR Congo and Sierra Leone, when assessing the Cambodian case of sexual violence and exploitation by UN peacekeepers, Whitworth points out that the troops were open about their use of prostitutes and their trips to brothels (2004: 67). She argues that this confidence to expose their sexual misconduct stems from the fact that they felt entitled to have sexual relations with local women and because they knew they would not be punished for their actions (2004: 67). As mentioned earlier, military leadership teaches soldiers that they are entitled to sexual relations with local women and that they will not be punished for it even though it goes against codes of conduct created by the UN (Whitworth 2004: 67). This is directly related to Enloe’s point regarding militaries justifying peacekeepers purchasing prostitutes and going to brothels because militaries argue that a lack of prostitution will lead to “recreational rape” and more violent sexual encounters (2000: 111). Here, the military neglects to mention the ways in which engaging in prostitution of local women constitutes as sexual exploitation. The examples provided in the synthesis section of this paper shows that rape of local women by peacekeepers does not stem from a sex drive that is perceived as natural. Instead it is about power assertion over women and unnatural hyper-masculine behaviours associated with militarized masculinity. All of the host countries cited in the synthesis experienced incidents of both sexual exploitation and sexual violence and rape. Thus, neither can be justified nor perceived as natural.

Sexual exploitation as a form of recreation and bonding between soldiers was made evident through the literature. For example, during an interview, a female UN civilian employee in the DR Congo told Higate that many male peacekeepers, “kept a ‘mental tally’ of the number of women or girls they had paid to have sex with as a way to compete with one another and ‘satisfy’ their sex drives” (2007: 106). As mentioned above, militarized masculinity is characterized by this idea of bonding over turning sexual encounters with local women into recreational activities (Enloe 2000: 111). Sub-Saharan Africa is not the only UN peacekeeping mission where evidence of sexual exploitation as a bonding tool has been cited. In both Cambodia and Bosnia, UN peacekeeping troops often went to brothels as a social gathering, where male peacekeepers would buy prostitutes for one another to encourage them to have sex and to see what their reactions would be (Whitworth 2004: 69; Cockburn and Hubic 2002: 110).
Whitworth argues that recreational use of prostitution is also a way for soldiers to legitimize their masculine identity within the group (2004: 165). It shows that they belong as a soldier because they embody the traits associated with militarized masculinity, including heterosexuality, toughness, and hyper-masculine behaviours (Whitworth 2004:165; Lopes 2011: 11).

When soldiers are taught to eliminate the feminine and the cultural “other” within themselves, they first have to become familiar with who the “other” is (Betts-Fetherston 1998: 159). As Betts-Fetherston has mentioned, since soldiers are taught to dehumanize the “other” in order to make it easier to engage in combat with them, it is important to understand how women are implicated within this as both the gendered and cultural “other” (1998: 159). Betts-Fetherston and Whitworth’s arguments combine to raise an important concern about peacekeeping: Since soldiers are taught to “other” women through both their culture and gender, it is likely that this will translate onto the peacekeeping scale if soldiers are not properly “demilitarized” before embarking on these missions (Betts-Fetherston 1998: 159; Whitworth 2004: 161). First, this section will provide examples of cultural insensitivity by peacekeepers in order to provide an understanding of how militarized masculinity is at work.

The peacekeepers that Higate interviewed did not seem to understand the economic, social, or historical context of local women’s lives (2007: 108). Higate says that based on his interviews, he noticed that generally, peacekeepers that engaged in prostitution seemed either oblivious to the fact that their actions could exacerbate the conflict or economic situation of the country or its people, or they thought that it was unlikely (2007: 108). More surprisingly, Higate’s fieldwork points out that peacekeepers mentioned that giving local women money in exchange for sex was a “benevolent act” (Higate and Henry 2004: 491). Similarly, Vandenberg notes that in Bosnia, some peacekeepers justified the purchase of Bosnian prostitutes by, “claiming they had ‘rescued’ the women” (2005: 156). However, according to some of the women who were prostitutes, it only meant that they were being transferred from one type of customer to another or from one group engaging in violence to another (Vandenberg 2005: 156).

This connects to militarized masculinity because, as Whitworth points out, since militarized masculinity has an inherent “us” versus “them” way of thinking, peacekeeping can become a venue through which the self is both constituted and inflicted on others (2004: 25). She argues that militarized masculinity is an unquestioned and taken for granted assumption that becomes an “associated narrative” of peacekeeping (2004: 25). Thus, when peacekeepers define their acts as “benevolent,” they are essentially explaining that the local women should be thankful that peacekeepers are there to give them money. This is problematic because examples such as these are emblematic of the insensitivity and lack of understanding of the gendered dynamics of the conflict (Vandenberg 2005: 154). It also has ethnocentric undertones, which are often instilled in national militaries (Betts-Fetherston 1998: 159). The theory of militarized masculinity suggests that soldiers are rarely trained in gender and cultural sensitivity because it is understood that a soldiers’ compassion towards the enemy takes away their ability to kill (Whitworth 2004: 155). The examples above explain that if soldiers embarking on peacekeeping missions are not adequately trained in these gendered and cultural aspects of the conflict, this cultural insensitivity will not disappear.

3 Refer to Appendix C
Higate and Henry point out that although many UN peacekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa believed that the act of giving money to local women in exchange for sex was benevolent, they would take cautious and “calculated” actions to meet up with local prostitutes discreetly (2004: 492-493). Higate and Henry argue that a report by the UNHCR and Save the Children UK, which looked at sexual exploitation by peacekeepers in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone did not deter peacekeepers from going to brothels, it influenced them to be discreet in order to avoid a public outcry (2004: 492). Peacekeepers told Higate that they were instructed by their superiors not to wear their uniforms or park the white UN vans outside of brothels, but to walk there in civilian clothing instead (2007: 105). Thus, there appears to be a contradiction here: Sometimes peacekeepers were open about their sexual relationships with local women because they claimed that the women were “actively enticing them,” but other times their actions were precise, and discreet (Higate and Henry 2004: 492-493). This shows that although the international community made it clear that sexual exploitation of local women is wrong, the officers still reinforced the idea that troops were entitled to go to brothels as long as the international community does not find out. Instead of teaching the troops about cultural sensitivity, officers reinforced and encouraged militarized masculine behaviour.

Another example of how peacekeeping troops maintain aspects of militarized masculinity can be seen through a general attitude of superiority held by many peacekeepers towards local women in the DR Congo (Higate 2007: 105). Higate contends that the colonial stereotype of hypersexualized ‘African’ women and girls prevailed amongst male peacekeepers (2007: 490). Arguing that they were seduced and drawn into sexual relations by these women was a way in which peacekeepers reinforced this colonial stereotype (Higate 2007: 490). According to Higate, through this rhetoric, the peacekeepers ended up justifying their sexual misconduct (2007: 490). As Betts-Fetherston has pointed out, relegating local women into the gendered and cultural categories of difference is an extremely problematic aspect of militarized masculinity (1998: 159). It is especially problematic when it is translated onto peacekeeping missions, where women’s insecurity within the conflict becomes exacerbated instead of eliminated (1998: 159).

**Militarized Masculinity: An Obstacle to Implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions**

Security Council Resolution 1325 was the first Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Resolution created by the UN in 2000 (Neuwirth 2002: 254). Since then, four other WPS Resolutions have been established to ensure that all areas of concern with regards to gender security and gender mainstreaming are included (Peacebuild 2011: 2). In general, the goal of the WPS Resolutions is to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence and to call for an increase in women’s participation in peace processes (Peacebuild 2011: 1). The creation of Resolution 1325 was considered a “landmark process,” as it was the first time that the UN recognized gender security and the roles of women in peace through large-scale policies (Peacebuild 2011: 1-2). Although the WPS Resolutions cover a wide range of gender issues within peace and conflict, there are some areas where the Resolutions call for enhanced gender security in peacekeeping. Resolutions 1325 and 1820 are the most relevant WPS Resolutions with regards to peacekeeping and sexual misconduct. Resolution 1325 “…legally requires gender

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4 Refer to Appendix D
mainstreaming on all UN peacekeeping and related state actions” (Carey 2007: 50). More specifically, the Security Council requests that the Secretary General:

…provide Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights, and the particular needs of women as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, invites the Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training (UN Security Council Resolution 1325 2000: 6).

WPS Resolution 1325 also calls on all parties “…to protect women and girls from sexual violence and to prosecute those responsible” (Carey 2007: 53).

Sections six, seven, and eight of WPS Resolution1820 focus specifically on gender security with regards to peacekeeping. Section six requests that the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, “…develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations…to help them better prevent, recognize, and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians” (UN Security Council Resolution 1820 2008: 6). Section seven calls on the Secretary-General to:

…Continue and strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United Nations peacekeeping operations; and urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel (UN Security Council Resolution 1820 2008: 7).

Finally, section eight of WPS Resolution 1820 encourages troop and police contributing countries to take initiative to heighten awareness and responsiveness of their own personnel (UN Security Council Resolution 1820 2008: 8). The reason for this is to “…protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police” (UN Security Council Resolution 1820 2008: 8).

The WPS Resolutions were the first of their kind to become more explicit in addressing gender security and gender mainstreaming with regards to peacekeeping (Carey 2007: 53). Similarly to the UN conventions, the WPS Resolutions are considered to be international law and implementation of the WPS Resolutions must occur through efforts made by contributing states (Peacebuild 2011: 2). However, the UN has also attempted to create implementation efforts that are intended for contributing states to use as guidelines, such as training and conduct manuals for peacekeeping missions. Although these efforts have been created, the goals of the WPS Resolutions are rarely being translated into practice (Carey 2007: 53). Although, there are many factors to consider when assessing why the WPS Resolutions have largely been unsuccessful in practice, militarized masculinity is a theory that can aid in providing some explanations. Militarized masculinity can explain why implementation has failed because it is rooted in other obstacles to implementation, such as impunity, training, and some prevailing practices of the UN, such as gender units and inclusion of women peacekeepers.
Militarized Masculinity and Training

Training of peacekeeping troops is a difficult obstacle to implementing the WPS Resolutions. The UN can provide recommendations and manuals for training, but ultimately Troop Contributing Countries (TCC’s) are responsible for peacekeeping pre-deployment training (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 4). According to the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, gender security training is the most effective way to avoid sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (2007: 4). However, the problem is that gender training is not included within the general training for peacekeepers; instead, TCC’s can choose whether or not to integrate gender training into their general training programs (Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 4). Some TCC’s have argued that gender training has been excluded because the timeline provided for pre-deployment training is often extremely limited (Raven-Roberts 2005: 57). Thus, it is argued that there is “no time” to incorporate gender issues because first and foremost, troops should learn emergency procedures, such as the administration of food and live-saving materials (Raven-Roberts 2005: 57). TCC’s have also argued that engaging in a gendered analysis of the conflict is unrealistic when the “real work” of saving lives must be taught first (Raven-Roberts 2005: 57). Although this can be considered a legitimate argument, examples in previous sections suggest that a lack of gender training can deplete the quality of life for local women and even the community at large. Furthermore, when gender training is actually conducted, many problems arise that suggest that there are more gendered dynamics at play that create obstacles to effective training.

In 2000, McKay (2005) was part of a group that created sample pre-deployment and in-mission gender training for UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Ethiopia, and Eritrea (265). The training study was conducted by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Training and Evaluation Service (TES) (McKay 2005: 265). The intention of these gender training samples was to provide TCC’s more gender training materials in order to foster implementation of WPS Resolution 1325 and to discover what does and does not work with regards to gender training (McKay 2005: 266). McKay argues that one of the biggest challenges that arose from the training samples was to create material on gender issues intended for a ninety percent male military audience, “…who had most likely not given the subject too much attention in the past, and who were likely to be defensive” (2005: 267). She expands on this by saying that examining gender theory was the main challenge because it required getting troops and the trainers to understand themselves, but by the same token, these theories had to be made invisible so as not to “scare off” the soldiers (2005: 268). McKay says that these challenges played out in practice. More specifically, military officers and soldiers thought that gender issues were simply “women’s stuff” or that the training was about sexual harassment or prejudice within the military, not between soldiers and local women (McKay 2005: 268). This shows that a general hyper-masculine culture dominates within the military and the military is extremely defensive over this culture (2005: 268).

After being involved in creating these sample training programs, McKay contends that the masculine culture within national militaries acts as an obstacle to implementing training suggestions by the UN (2005: 270). More specifically, she found that senior-level officers would often explicitly discredit gender training (2005: 270). This confounds the process in general because if officers do not believe gender training is necessary, it will not get reinforced during
the mission (McKay 2005: 275). This way of thinking can also trickle down onto lower-level soldiers. For example, during a training session in Ethiopia, one senior UN military officer argued that since peacekeeping troops are far from home, they deserve to have time off to have sex with local women and that they “…are not going to think very much about gender or human rights” (McKay 2005: 275). McKay points out that this was “unfortunately predictable” due to the hyper-masculine culture within the military (2005: 275). After engaging in the gender training in Eritrea, McKay said that a military colonel argued that gender training was a waste of time because soldiers were not going to stop engaging in sexual relations with local women (2005: 275). Furthermore, based on her experience in East Timor, McKay writes, “Having a colonel declare that women do not need to be represented at the ‘peace table’ and that male politicians, bureaucrats, and local authorities are able to fully represent women’s interests stifles any inclination to disagreement by junior personnel” (2005: 273). These examples show that masculinity has posed as an obstacle to implementing training programs set-forth by the WPS Resolutions.

The DPKO states that it has implemented gender awareness-raising courses, along with more specific gender training that focus on consequences of trafficking of local women (DPKO Gender Resource Package 2005: 45). However, the training courses are optional for states to implement and many TCC’s delegate their militaries to conduct pre-deployment training (DPKO Gender Resource Package 2005: 45). As a result, gender training is often ignored because the culture within national militaries generally does not consider gender issues to be important (McKay 2005: 273). Subsequently, another reason why gender training has not been successful for peacekeeping missions is because the same people that conduct the general training also conduct the gender training: male military officers (McKay 2005: 267). Furthermore, gender specialists, whether from national civil society groups or from within the UN itself, are not called upon to help administer the training (McKay 2005: 267). McKay says that this is problematic because the training is not administered by someone that is familiar with the gendered dynamics of conflict (2005: 267). She argues that in general, the culture of the military is the hardest obstacle to overcome when implementing gender training (2005: 278). She says:

The biggest change of all, and the greatest challenge, remains the nature of the military itself. That there is a contradiction between the warrior soldier, trained for arms and to fight and kill, and the image of the peacekeeper, trained to negotiate, protect, and refuse tension…We tell them to be sensitive to other cultural norms, customs, and behaviours when they themselves are saturated in one of the most pervasive and powerful, masculinized professional cultures in the world, a culture to which they must truly belong if they are to fulfill their warrior function (2005: 278).

Thus, militarized masculinity serves as a stumbling block to successful gender training for peacekeepers because it is difficult to get an institution to recognize the downfalls of its culture and to make changes to it.

**Militarized Masculinity and Impunity**

UN peacekeepers exercise impunity because it is mandated through trilateral agreements between the UN, TCC’s, and host countries of the missions (Bedont 2005: 84). These agreements outline that peacekeepers are granted “special immunity” while on peacekeeping
missions (Bedont 2005: 86). This means that peacekeepers that engage in misconduct cannot be prosecuted by the host state; instead, peacekeeping troops can only be prosecuted within their home countries (Bedont 2005: 86). The reason for this impunity agreement is because TCC’s want to ensure that their troops will not be punished in host countries (Bedont, 2005: 86). Another rationale of the agreement for TCC’s is that since troops are sent there to assist in ending conflict, they should not be prosecuted there (Bedont, 2005: 86). The rationale for the UN is to ensure that there is enough incentive for TCC’s to provide troops (Bedont 2005: 86). One problem with this is that many TCC’s rarely prosecute or even repatriate peacekeepers that engage in sexual misconduct, including sexual violence and sexual exploitation and the UN is incapable of taking action when TCC’s fail to punish their troops (Bedont 2005: 86). The questions that arise here are why TCC’s do not punish their troops that engage in sexual misconduct and why the UN’s efforts to deter troops from sexual misconduct with local women are not working.

Militarized masculinity can help shed light on these questions. The fact that military peacekeepers are not investigated or penalized once reports are released about sexual misconduct suggests that militarized masculinity is a top-down problem (Bedont 2005: 90). Furthermore, as argued in previous sections, many in-mission officers condone certain forms of sexual misconduct, such as prostitution. Thus, troops are essentially being told that despite UN policies, their behaviours with regards to sexual relations with local women will not be punished.

Another problem is that TCC’s often leave their military courts responsible for investigating and prosecuting sexual misconduct by peacekeeping soldiers (Bedont 2005: 90). Bedont argues that TCC’s should not use military courts to prosecute peacekeeping soldiers who engage in sexual misconduct because of the pervasiveness of militarized masculinity (2005: 90). She says:

As a male dominated institution, the military is particularly unsuitable for prosecuting individuals in cases of violence against women. Many of the problems that arise in peacekeeping missions are the product of militarized masculinity, namely, the glorification of masculine aggression…Relegating responsibility for prosecuting persons who commit violence against women to those within such a culture therefore creates problems (2005: 90).

Thus, it can be ineffective to prosecute sexual misconduct within the same culture through which militarized masculinity is created and condoned.

Bedont points out that when cases of sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers are brought to military courts, they are often dismissed because courts argue that there is not enough evidence to prosecute the accused (2005: 90). For example, in Cambodia, many complaints of sexual violence were brought to NGO’s, however, a significant amount of time had passed since the incidents took place (Whitworth 2004: 70). Therefore, UN officials and TCC’s claimed that they were not able to gather any evidence (Whitworth 2004: 70). Chea Veth, a Cambodian native and UNTAC humanitarian aid worker told Whitworth that, “maybe we should have tried to follow up on issues like this more than we did, but there were so many things happening and it was such a busy time” (Whitworth 2004: 53). Thus, it seems as though sexual violence investigations become lost in the chaos of the overarching conflict. Although it is possible that this is often the case, Bedont contends that part of the reason why cases are dismissed is because they are not viewed as troublesome TCC’s due to the general atmosphere
within the military that condones hyper-masculine behaviour (2005: 90). Bedont looks at the Italian military court system as an example of this. She says that the Italian military was unable to effectively prosecute peacekeepers that raped and tortured Somali civilians in 1997 (2005: 90). According to Bedont, a specific legal structure to prosecute peacekeepers of rape and torture did not exist within the national military court (2005: 90). More specifically, rape, torture, and maltreatment against civilians was not covered within the Military Penal Code, which led to cases being dropped (Bedont 2005: 90). It is also important to consider why local women wait to report incidents of sexual violence. Patel and Tripodi argue that local women do not feel comfortable reporting sexual violence male UN personnel because they feel as though they are either making themselves more vulnerable or that their issues will not be taken seriously (2005: 592). Since men currently make up more than ninety percent of peacekeeping personnel, local women do not have much of an option (UN Gender Statistics 2012).

WPS Resolution 1820 calls on TCC’s to be more effective at prosecuting peacekeepers and the UN has developed some efforts to deter troops from sexual misconduct. Since the UN itself cannot prosecute peacekeepers, Codes of Conduct are one of the main ways through which the UN has attempted to reinforce its Zero Tolerance policy for sexual violence and exploitation (Higate and Henry 2004: 487). Unfortunately, the UN’s attempts to implement successful Codes of Conduct are not being taken seriously by peacekeepers or officers (Higate and Henry 204: 487). For example, in 2004, the UN implemented a new Code of Conduct for peacekeepers in the DR Congo in hopes that peacekeepers would fear the consequences if they violated the code (Higate and Henry 2004: 487). The Code had six components focusing specifically on sexual exploitation and violence. It condemned any act of sexual abuse, exploitation, or humiliation, any type of sexual activity with children under eighteen, the use of children or adults to attain sexual services for others, exchanging money, goods, or employment in exchange for sex, or visits to brothers (MONUC Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 2004). The Code also points out that sexual relationships between peacekeepers and local women are strongly discouraged, since they are inherently based on an unequal power imbalance (MONUC Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 2004). During his studies in the DR Congo, Higate says that peacekeepers did not take the Code of Conduct seriously (Higate 2007: 112). He argues that the general consensus amongst MONUC peacekeepers was that the code of conduct was “just another piece of paper you put in your pocket,” instead of a set of rules that will pose real consequences (2007: 112). This shows how militarized masculinity prevents the UN’s efforts from being effective in practice. The culture amongst the military in general, not simply between soldiers, is an obstacle to implementing the WPS Resolutions in peacekeeping.

**Militarized Masculinity and the Implementation Practices of the UN**

Some feminist scholars argue that the UN system in general views gender as a “token” issue instead of a central one and that people have reported a general animosity toward gender issues within the UN (Whitworth 2004: 123; Raven-Roberts 2005: 44). As a result, the workings of the UN system sometimes allow militarized masculinity to flourish without the intention of doing so (Whitworth 2004: 123). Raven-Roberts, a former UN program officer argues that there are two misperceptions within the UN that allow violence against local women by peacekeepers to flourish, “…at one level, gender is still treated as if it were about women and women’s issues and therefore, it is the role of women to deal with these issues. At another level are claims that
gender is now outdated and no longer an issue within the United Nations” (2005: 57). Raven-Roberts also says that the UN’s efforts to change gender as an “add-on” to the general practices of the UN are “ultimately patchy and ad hoc” (2005: 52). Gender units and advisers for peacekeeping missions are an example of how gender is treated as a “token” issue by the UN (Whitworth 2004: 130). Gender units were established after WPS Resolution 1325 as an attempt to enhance the security of local women (Whitworth 2004: 130). They consist of a group of gender advisers that the UN sometimes sends on peacekeeping missions to monitor women’s issues in the host country, conduct gender awareness training, and work with local women’s organizations (Whitworth 2004: 130). Many gender units have either minimal or no funding provided by the UN (Whitworth 2004: 130). For example, the gender unit in East Timor was canceled because the budget for the unit was reallocated to another aspect of the mission (Whitworth 204:130). Furthermore, in Kosovo, gender advisers were present, however, they did not conduct gender training for troops or work with local women’s groups (Raven-Roberts 2005: 54). In fact, according to Raven-Roberts, none of the local Women’s groups had even heard of the gender adviser (2005: 54).

With regards to the lack of funding towards gender security, the UN’s view is that more immediate issues relating to the conflict in the host countries, such as humanitarian aid must receive funding first (Raven-Roberts 2005: 57). However, both Whitworth and Raven-Roberts argue that women’s security must be considered as one of these “rapid action” issues because when women’s security is not upheld, peace can never be achieved (Raven-Roberts 2005: 59; Whitworth, 2004: 121). In order to enhance implementation of the WPS Resolutions, the UN hired Margot Wallstrom to be the Special Representative for the Secretary General on Sexual Violence (MONUSCO 2010). However, her role does not address sexual misconduct by peacekeepers (UN Focus 2010: 7). When asked about whether this falls under her mandate, she said, “Not directly. But it will indirectly, because it only takes one case and the whole credibility of what the UN peacekeepers are doing will be put into question. We really do have to demonstrate our commitment to eradicate this” (UN Focus 2010: 17). Wallstrom’s response shows that the UN is unsure about who has official authority to encourage implementation of the WPS Resolutions in practice (Lopes 2011: 21).

Enloe (2001) and Whitworth (2004) point out that the UN’s inconsistency is linked to militarized masculinity because gender is used to further the status quo of the UN and as a result, gender is changed from a “critical” term to an uncritical term that promotes the prevailing practices of both militaries and the UN itself. Enloe says that “too frequently these days, ‘gender’ is used as if it were just a bureaucratically comfortable synonym for women” and as a result, the UN’s focus on ‘gender’ leaves “…the politics of masculinity (and masculinities) safely off the policy table” (2001: 111). Although some feminist scholars argue that the practices of the UN condone militarized masculinity, even if this was not the intention, the gender security norms that the UN created through the WPS Resolutions are still crucial for paving the way to end sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers (Stiehm 2001: 39). More efforts need to be taken by all parties within peacekeeping missions to ensure that these gender norms are implemented (Stiehm 2001: 39).
Suggestions for More Effective Implementation of the WPS Resolutions

Whitworth argues that, the “continued lament” that the UN must provide greater gender mainstreaming resources or developing more studies on how UN practices can become more “gendered” is a mute point because the UN has a gender culture within itself that ultimately condones militarized masculinity (2004: 139). Thus, she argues that the culture itself needs to be transformed5 (2004: 139). In contrast, some authors such as Stiehm are more optimistic, saying that although implementation is still lacking, the creation of the WPS Resolutions demonstrates that the UN is committed to gender security and gender mainstreaming (2001: 47). This section will provide suggestions for reform based on the notion that despite the fact that the UN’s efforts to implement the WPS Resolutions have allowed militarized masculinity to thrive, there are possibilities for implementation of the WPS Resolutions that can address militarized masculinity more adequately and help offset its pervasiveness. These suggestions for reform are listed below.

1. National Level Mandatory Gender Training for All Ranks

One of the main problems suggested in the literature was that senior-level officers do not have to participate in gender training, causing a trickle-down effect of viewing gender training as unnecessary amongst troops (McKay 2005: 267). Making pre-deployment gender training mandatory for all TCC ranks departing on peacekeeping missions might aid in preventing officers from reinforcing a general atmosphere that gender issues do not need to be taken seriously. Training for officers might also aid in teaching them about the importance of adhering to the Codes of Conduct while on mission, as the exploitation of women and girls can lead to an unsuccessful mission. Perhaps framing the issue through the argument that sexual exploitation creates unsuccessful missions will make both officers and troops more willing follow the Code of Conduct more closely. Framing the issue this way might also make TCC’s more likely to make gender training mandatory.

Many TCC’s are in the process of developing National Action Plans (NAP’s) to implement the WPS Resolutions and mandatory training for all ranks should be a top priority (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 4). Feminist groups around the world are coming together to make recommendations to their governments discussing how to address militarized masculinity in their NAP’s (Peacebuild 2011: 1-2). One suggestion discussed amongst Canadian feminist NGO’s and civil society groups was that training should be more long-term, rather than quickly executed (Peacebuild 2011: 1). Even though pre-deployment training often has to occur quickly since TCC’s are not given much time to prepare for missions, gender training should take place both before, during, and after the missions (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 4). The reason for this is because there is much to cover in gender training that cannot be done in the time currently allotted. The importance of not engaging in sexual exploitation or violence and issues of cultural sensitivity should be discussed in pre-deployment training and issues of gender identity can be more long-term goals.

In addition, if gender units are given more funding, they can act as educators to continue training of peacekeepers. This would allow gender training to extend far beyond the hour or two

5 Refer to Appendix E
that it is currently given in training. For example, “gender identity” could be used at first and slowly work up to an understanding of militarized masculinity in training that continues throughout and beyond the mission. Furthermore, Myrtinnen (2003) suggests that training could instruct peacekeeping personnel to examine already existing non-violent masculinities and femininities associated with peacekeeping operations in order for troops to gain a sense of the ideal traits of peacekeepers (44; Lopes 2010: 24). This might aid in creating a more positive masculine identity for troops before they embark on missions because they are aware of what is expected of them in terms of how they identify as peacekeepers. Norway is an example of best practice with regards to mandatory gender training because it is nationally mandated that soldiers are trained in human trafficking and WPS Resolution 1325 for all military ranks (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 4). Although Norway’s training does not focus on gender identity, the training that the country currently provides is a stepping-stone to an acceptance of more critical forms of gender training.

2. More Cohesive Partnerships between Civil Society Groups and Peacekeeping Officers in Training

Patel and Tripodi argue that training programs for peacekeeping troops must be conducted alongside feminist civil society groups because civil society members have a deeper understanding of the gendered effects of the sexual misconduct of peacekeepers (2005: 592; Lopes 2011: 25). During in-mission training, local women’s groups could take part in training to explain how sexual violence by peacekeepers sabotages their communities as well as the mission itself. This might spark a realization in peacekeeping troops that engaging in sexual violence and exploitation of local women truly can exacerbate the economic and social hardships within the country as well as the conflict itself.

3. Make Sexual Violence More Punishable for All Ranks

Since the military appears to be unwilling to reconstruct militarized masculinity, NAP’s need to ensure that sexual misconduct will be punished by TCC’s through repatriation of soldiers or within national non-military courts (McKay 2005: 270). Although some scholars would argue that this goal only acts as a band-aid solution to militarized masculinity, a fear of prosecution will deter peacekeepers from engaging in sexual violence. This is a more short-term suggestion, however, ensuring that peacekeepers will be punished if they engage in sexual misconduct can act as deterrence, while more long-term attempts are made through training. Both of these suggestions need to work simultaneously in order for incidents of sexual violence and exploitation by peacekeepers to decrease. Again, Norway is an example of best practice with regards to instilling a fear of punishment in its troops (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 5). Brita Scawlann from the Norwegian ministry of defense released a statement, saying “The important thing is that when soldiers go abroad, they know what is expected from them as representatives for our national forces. Also, the rules are being put into practice. Soldiers who for instance buy sexual services when abroad are being repatriated” (In Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 5).
4. Make the Special Representative for the Secretary General Sexual Violence More Active Within the Peacekeeping Forum

As mentioned in the previous section, authority over ensuring that gender security is being implemented in peacekeeping seems quite ambiguous (Lopes 2011: 21). The Special Representative for the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence should take on responsibility for monitoring gender security issues in peacekeeping to keep track of security issues of local women. This is a more long-term institutional goal, however, Margot Wallstrom herself has recognized that more needs to be done to ensure that peacekeepers do not engage in sexual violence against local women. For example, she said, “We can actually do more training and vetting before the peacekeepers are deployed. We should also ensure that any such cases are immediately dealt with” (UN Focus 2010: 17). It is suggested that Wallstrom work with the UN to get more funding for gender units in order to bring this goal to fruition.

5. Increased Inclusion of Women Peacekeeping Personnel

Increased inclusion of women peacekeeping personnel on missions is important not only because gender equality is important, but also because research points out that the presence of women peacekeepers helps to offset militarized masculinity to the point where sexual exploitation of local women becomes less frequent (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 6). Thus, the presence of women peacekeepers can help to offset militarized masculinity (Patel and Tripodi 2005: 595). However, as of February 2012, only 3.75 percent of all UN peacekeeping personnel were women (UN Gender Statistics 2012). The statistics show that more efforts need to be taken to ensure that women are incorporated in the peacekeeping process (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 6). The DPKO set a goal of raising the percentage of women peacekeeping police and military personnel from around three percent to ten percent (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2007: 6). However, instead of focusing solely on increasing women military and police personnel, it is suggested that the DPKO should also focus on recruiting women from civil society groups and NGO’s.

A case from Liberia shows the success of incorporating women in peacekeeping. In 2007, an all female unit from India’s police force was sent into the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia (Patel and Tripodi 2005: 594). One of the findings of this mission was that as peacekeepers, women are more accepting of the psycho-social effects of trauma, not because women are inherently more emotional, but because it is more socially acceptable for women to deal with the emotional aspects of conflict than men (Patel and Tripodi 2005: 594; Lopes 2011: 27). Two more examples come from UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia and South Africa. In Namibia, forty percent of UN peacekeepers were women and in South Africa, fifty percent of peacekeepers were women (Carey 2001: 54). In these missions, it was reported that local women felt more at ease with the presence of peacekeeping troops because of the presence of UN women and local women were more likely to report concerns with regards to their security because they felt as though they were being represented (Carey 2001: 54). This created an atmosphere that made sexual exploitation less acceptable (Carey 2001: 54). Furthermore,
through his research on Namibia and South Africa, Carey argues that, “…if at least 30 percent of
mission personnel are female, then local women more quickly join peace committees, which are
less hierarchical and more responsive to female concerns” (2001: 54). Thus, it is important to
increase the goal for the number of women included in peacekeeping missions, as the inclusion
of women has multiple benefits that can help make peacekeeping operations more successful. In
order to increase the number of women, TCC’s should begin to consider recruiting women from
areas of society that are less conventional than police or military forces, such as civil society and
NGO’s.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that sexual violence and exploitation of local women by UN
peacekeepers is a problem that prevents not only gender security, but also the success of the
peace process itself (Raven-Roberts 2005: 59). Engaging in sexual violence is contradictory to
the behaviours and characteristics associated with peacekeeping and therefore, it is important to
study what causes this behaviour in order to understand how to put an end to it (Whitworth 2004:
104). Whitworth’s theory of militarized masculinity aids in explaining this phenomenon. Since
the majority of peacekeepers are from the military, these soldiers often bring hyper-masculine
and highly militarized behaviours with them on peacekeeping missions, resulting in higher rates
of sexual violence and exploitation of local women (Whitworth 2004: 184).

This paper has also demonstrated that the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions are an
important step to enhancing gender security and increasing women’s participation in
peacekeeping. However, although these Resolutions are widely accepted within the international
community in theory, they are not being implemented in practice (Carey 2001: 57). One of the
underlying reasons for this disconnect between theory and practice is that militarized masculinity
exacerbates existing obstacles to implementing the WPS Resolutions, while also creating new
ones. Militarized masculinity exacerbates the obstacles that training and impunity already create
because the masculine culture within the military is institution-wide and as a result, sexual
misconduct with local women is viewed as inevitable and sometimes even encouraged
(Whitworth 2004: 152). Militarized masculinity also exacerbates obstacles to the UN’s
implementation efforts because the pervasiveness of militarized masculinity is not recognized
within current UN practices (Enloe 2001: 111). Thus, the success of efforts to implement UN
policies for enhancing gender security in peacekeeping must recognize that militarized
masculinity both exacerbates and creates obstacles.

Although some authors argue that the UN has its own gender culture that condones
militarized masculinity, this paper demonstrated that other literature suggests a higher level of
optimism and provides suggestions for more successful implementation of the WPS Resolutions
that will provide steps to eliminate the pervasiveness of militarized masculinity (Whitworth
2004: 139; Stiehm 2001: 47). Mandatory gender training for all ranks, cohesive partnerships
between civil society and peacekeepers, extending the role of the Special Representative for
Sexual violence, and increasing the recruitment of women peacekeeping personnel are necessary
steps in order to ensure that militarized masculinity is both addressed and counteracted.
Bibliography


